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Sofia Frasz
Impacts of Censorship On Political Polarization

Abstract
Ideological and affective polarization across party lines has grown significantly in the
United States in the past several decades. It has hit a high point in the years since President
Donald Trump’s election. At the same time, citizens who identify as conservative, Republican, or
libertarian have expressed concerns over a perceived increase in social media censorship of their
ideas. Whether real or perceived, the fear of censorship has directly contributed to a vicious
cycle of political antagonism: those who feel censored (most likely to identify as right-leaning)
blame members of the other party (who are often assumed to be left-leaning) for suppressing
them, which angers those people and causes even further antagonism between more extreme
members of each side. By examining ten case studies in three countries, this paper will
demonstrate that governments and other entities which engage in censorship cause an increase in
political polarization between their citizens.

Introduction
Democrats and Republicans have become increasingly polarized along party lines in
recent decades. This polarization is both ideological and affective: both parties disagree on
policy approaches and have become more hostile toward one another. Political polarization is not
always a negative thing, because people should feel comfortable with holding and understanding
a wide array of opinions. Diversity of thought and civil discourse should be encouraged in any
society. However, much of the polarization in the United States is negative. Americans attack,
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insult, and ostracize each other for holding different opinions, which drives rifts between
families, coworkers, and friends (Dimock et al., 2014). Our society is becoming less tolerant of
differing opinions, and many Americans seek to silence opinions with which they disagree. This
threatens the quality of our democracy; according to Ziblatt and Levitsky (2018), if people view
members of a different political party as enemies, then they will be more willing to ignore the
rules of democratic governance, such as mutual tolerance and forbearance. Consequently,
members of our government will be more willing to cheat the rules of our democracy in order to
prevent the “enemy” from taking power, instead of engaging in civil discourse and respecting the
regular peaceful exchanges of power. Affective polarization threatens both the quality of life of
individual citizens, and the quality of our democratic political system.
The controversies surrounding election fraud, government policies on COVID-19, and
even the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic have only exacerbated the problem, as partisans
express distinct views on these topics. Republicans and others on the right have claimed that Big
Tech (Google, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter, and Apple) has been censoring their opinions on
these subjects by shadowbanning (deliberately hiding tags, search results, and posts) their social
media posts, banning them outright from social media platforms for failing to follow
vaguely-defined community guidelines, and fact-checking their posts, all without
shadowbanning, banning, or fact-checking an equal proportion of posts by left-leaning users.
These concerns peaked after Twitter and various other social media platforms banned President
Trump’s accounts, and after Apple, Amazon, and Google removed the conservative-dominated
social media app Parler from their stores.
My research will argue that government policies which encourage censorship, either
implicitly or explicitly, will exacerbate political polarization (both ideological and affective) in
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the United States because they will lead the right-leaning objects of censorship to resent those on
the left. This is known as the backlash effect: when people’s ideas are countered either by
censorship or by conflicting information, they may double down on their current beliefs and feel
more hostility toward the opposing side (Klein, 2018). Even though the majority of Democrats
and leftists in the United States are not engaging in direct censorship of right-leaning voices, the
most influential voices of progressivism (Big Tech corporations) are the loudest. This makes the
average progressive a target for right-leaning resentment and creates a feedback loop of hostility
between the left and the right. As a result, policies which support political censorship will
worsen political polarization in the United States. Many proponents of censorship argue that it is
sometimes necessary in order to prevent the spread of fake news and misinformation which
could inhibit the functioning of our democracy by polarizing voters. However, evidence shows
that the spread of fake news generally polarizes only strong partisans and has little impact on the
majority of voters (Barbera, 2020). Moreover, exposure to fake news has been shown to merely
strengthen voters’ existing partisan alignments and has no effect on their intended vote choices
(Guess et al., 2020). Therefore, censorship is an unnecessary overreaction to a problem with a
very limited impact.
I will begin my paper by providing background information on partisan polarization in
the US, explaining how government policies have led a few large technology corporations to
dominate the market, and linking polarization with corporate censorship of right-leaning voices.
President Trump’s bans from major social media platforms and companies’ attempts to remove
Parler from their stores raise important questions. Is Big Tech engaging in censorship, even if
these companies are not official government actors? Then, if these companies are censoring
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right-leaning viewpoints, how will that impact political discourse in the United States? Will it
worsen partisan and affective polarization between Republicans and Democrats?
In order to support my central argument regarding the perils of censorship, I will argue
that these companies are indeed engaging in censorship, because they are not entirely private;
and this is problematic for the state of political polarization in the US. All of these companies
receive enormous tax breaks and other privileges from state and federal governments, which give
them an unfair advantage over smaller companies who do not receive the same government
assistance. This allows Big Tech to dominate the market, particularly in the area of social media.
As a result, people who use platforms such as Facebook, YouTube (which is owned by Google)
and Twitter have very few alternatives if they are banned from speaking on these platforms.
When conservative and libertarian Twitter users tried to leave and join Parler instead, Google,
Apple, and Amazon removed Parler from their stores. This raises important questions about
freedom of speech, which is a cornerstone of a democratic society. Because state and federal
governments have conferred unfair advantages upon Parler’s competitors, these companies were
able to grow powerful enough to exclude Parler, as well as the conservatives and libertarians
who are more likely to choose Parler over Twitter, from the market. Thus, the members of Big
Tech can no longer be considered truly private companies, so their banning, shadowbanning, and
hostility toward right-leaning users counts as censorship which has been enabled by government
action.
Next, using general political theory and case studies from three countries, including
China, Russia, and the United States during World War I and the era of McCarthyism, I will
demonstrate that policies supporting political censorship consistently worsen ideological and
affective polarization. I will use polling data, legislation, historical narratives (including
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first-hand accounts), and media reports to analyze the impacts of censorship policies on social
and political behavior. From here, I will search for evidence of government persecution of
specific political viewpoints, as well as social ostracism or violent retaliation against people who
express certain political opinions, in order to demonstrate deepening ideological and affective
polarization. In the end, I will conclude that the implementation of policies which reduce
restrictions on speech and expression, whether those restrictions result from explicit
governmental actions or actions by government-sponsored corporations, will be the first step
toward fostering healthier political discourse between parties and reducing polarization.
Though the legal implications of Big Tech censorship are still relatively unknown, my
research makes the political implications clear. The legal status of many Big Tech companies, as
to whether they should be treated as public or private corporations under the law, is under debate
in Congress. However, it is indisputable that Big Tech companies’ censorship and labeling of
information has led to intense political divisions between right-leaning and left-leaning users.
Right-leaning users find themselves accused and sanctioned by these companies (and many
right-leaning users believe that these companies lean to the political left) for “spreading
misinformation,” so they develop animosity toward left-leaning users and companies which
encourage those measures. Because people who have strong political opinions tend to be
emotionally attached to those opinions, left-leaning users feel attacked by right-leaning users
who argue with them, so they attempt to suppress right-wing opinions. This creates a vicious
cycle of affective polarization as arguments become more emotionally charged, and of
ideological polarization as neither side is willing to compromise its beliefs or agree on any truths.
My research will show that this cycle of political vitriol has been replicated many times
throughout history in the United States and in countries with a more obvious history of political
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censorship. There is a clear historical basis for the pattern that censorship creates, even though
the legal implications of these corporations’ actions are still unclear.

Normative Issues Related to Censorship
In Farmers Educational & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc. (1959), The US Supreme Court
defined censorship as “any examination of thought or expression in order to prevent publication
of 'objectionable' material” (Vile, 2009). This definition of censorship implies that both private
and public entities can censor material, and therefore potentially infringe upon individual rights
to freedom of speech.
There are many supposed benefits of censorship. Many argue that censorship will curb
the spread of fake news, reduce political extremism, and prevent people from falling into online
echo chambers (spaces in which people are only exposed to viewpoints like their own, and never
encounter any countervailing viewpoints). Some would argue that the costs of fake news
outweigh the costs of censorship. Sunstein (2020) argues that fake news causes reputational harm
to public figures and institutions. It can lead consumers of that fake news to distrust certain
public figures and institutions, and low levels of public trust can harm a democracy by making it
easier for people to label each other as “enemies.” When people automatically assume that others
have bad intentions, they are less willing to work with each other to find common ground and
solve problems. Furthermore, some fake news can go as far as becoming libelous, which causes
legal issues for the parties involved. Deepfakes and doctored videos can also dangerously
mislead the public and cause them to act on erroneous information. Sunstein (2020) writes that
deepfakes can damage people’s reputations by showing them committing crimes which they did
not commit, or showing them endorsing an idea or a party which they do not support. In this
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way, deepfakes can be used to manipulate the public into distrusting people and institutions who
should be trusted to maintain democratic resilience. Needless violence, protests, hysteria, and
unrest can erupt when people are led to act on false information. For these reasons, many argue
that fake news must be identified and censored.
Echo chambers are often believed to present a similar problem by facilitating the spread
of false information. In general, people tend to consume media that makes them psychologically
comfortable and reinforces their current beliefs; on the internet, they can easily opt out of
consuming political information that makes them uncomfortable and fall into echo chambers
(Prior, 2005). According to Sunstein (2017), echo chambers can endanger democracy by
spreading false information, preventing bipartisan cooperation on important policy initiatives,
and affectively polarize partisans. At their worst, echo chambers and the consumption of fake
news could lead to a large portion of the population developing false beliefs that motivate them
to act on violent extremism. Thus, it may be argued that censorship is sometimes necessary to
prevent people from consuming media that draws them toward extremism.
However, there is little empirical evidence to support the idea that these issues with fake
news, echo chambers, and extremism are much of a problem in the first place. As a result, it does
not make sense for social media platforms to censor users’ posts. According to Barbera (2020), it
is not even clear whether or not social media creates echo chambers. Some users may be able to
use social media algorithms to their advantage and completely cut themselves off from any
information that contradicts their worldviews, while others may be exposed to a significant
amount of cross-cutting information through friends or other users who express a variety of
political views. Then, according to Allcot and Gentzkow (2017), social media does not spread
fake news in significantly harmful capacities (most people only saw around one to three fake
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news stories on social media during the 2016 election cycle), and when people do encounter fake
news, they are generally less likely to believe it than they are to believe real news; most people
who encounter fake news are able to distinguish it from real news. As a result, censorship on
social media attempts to fix a problem that does not really exist. In fact, there are reasons to
believe that censorship creates more problems than it solves. Limiting the spread of fake news
and misinformation when there is no compelling reason to do so can be harmful to democracy,
because people believe that this form of censorship is an attack on their right to freedom of
expression (Guess et al., 2020).
Today, with technology and social media platforms becoming an ubiquitous part of
everyday life for individuals, businesses, and other entities, it is worth considering whether the
technology and social media companies that comprise Big Tech can now be considered public
utilities (like radio stations) or if they can still be considered privately-owned. The answer
appears to lie somewhere in between these two options. These companies are owned by private
individuals, not by members of government. However, virtually all of them receive copious
amounts of funding from state governments, and benefit from tax breaks and other incentives
which grant them an advantage over their smaller competitors. Therefore, although the Big Tech
companies are technically privately-owned, they maintain their dominance over the technology
market with a significant amount of help from government entities and special policies, so they
cannot truly be considered private businesses. The significant amount of government investment
in the Big Tech companies grants them a status that lies somewhere between that of a private
company and a public utility; like public utilities, these platforms provide a service to the general
public (Wex Definitions Team, 2020) and receive some public (taxpayer/government) funding,
but they are privately-owned at the same time. As a result, because these companies have some
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characteristics of public utilities, their censorship of “misinformation” is worrisome because it
excludes people who hold certain political beliefs from services which their taxpayer dollars
fund. Thus, Big Tech censorship is akin to government censorship because these companies
deplatform users while accepting subsidies and incentives from governments.
Big Tech censorship is of particular concern at this moment because millions of
individuals and businesses have come to rely on these large platforms to gain an audience, to
advertise, and to monetize their work. If these platforms prevent people from accessing utilities
which their taxpayer dollars fund, it raises serious questions about whether government-funded
entities should have the power to decide who gets to use other taxpayer-funded services, and it
prevents people from using crucial public resources that their customers and audience members
use to learn about their products and follow their work. Big Tech censorship matters because it
can completely disconnect individuals and businesses from the people who fund their
livelihoods. Entire businesses built on platforms like YouTube and Instagram can be destroyed
overnight if Big Tech companies decide that they disagree with a business’s message or ideals.
Once again, because Big Tech companies receive significant government subsidies, this is akin
to the government paying one of its branches to decide which beliefs, messages, and ideals are
acceptable to disseminate, which raises serious implications for users’ First Amendment rights to
freedom of expression.

The Big Tech Oligopoly: Where It Came From and Why It Matters
Over the past century, the consolidation of media ownership has led to our current
debates over censorship. Media consolidation causes concerns over censorship because it limits
viewers’ choices with regards to the viewpoints they consume, and with regards to the
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viewpoints they wish to express. Opinions which differ from those approved by the six
companies (GE, NewsCorp, Disney, Viacom, Time Warner, and CBS) that own nearly all media
outlets in the United States may be excluded entirely. By contrast, if viewers and users had more
media choices than those owned by the six major companies, they would be able to see and
express a wider variety of viewpoints. When people feel limited with regards to the ideas that
they can consume and express, they begin to feel marginalized and even disliked by those who
are in charge of the moderation of ideas, because they are emotionally attached to their beliefs
and do not want to feel like their beliefs are being attacked (Klein, 2018). This causes people to
double down on their beliefs and develop feelings of resentment toward the people who are
perceived to be blocking or attacking their beliefs. This process results in affective polarization
because it leads one side to believe the other side is marginalizing it.
A specific timeline of policies has led to the extreme media consolidation that we see
today. It is important to understand the history of media consolidation so that we can identify the
root causes of our current issues with censorship. We cannot solve our current issues without
understanding how they came to be in the first place. If we understand the root causes of media
consolidation in the United States, then we can address those root causes directly and
purposefully. This will enable us to solve these problems more efficiently than if we merely
attacked the social and political symptoms resulting from media consolidation. Addressing the
symptoms without addressing the causes may lead us to short-term solutions, but will not
generate any meaningful, lasting changes.
The foundations for media consolidation were laid in 1927 when Congress passed the
Radio Act, which empowered the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) to regulate radio broadcasts.
The FRC could now issue and deny licenses to radio operators, which prompted concerns about
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radio operators’ First Amendment rights. Essentially, the federal government could now
determine who could and could not use a specific type of public forum to spread a message.
Specific radio frequencies were reserved for specific licensed broadcasters, to be used for a
specific purpose (Hazlett, 2018).
In 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FFC) replaced the FRC. The FFC’s
control expanded beyond that of the FRC and narrowed the market of communications
technologies that were allowed to compete with each other. Conventional wisdom holds that such
regulation became necessary due to a market failure inherent to the radio industry. It is often said
that there were too many competing channels which led to harmful static interferences and other
negative externalities. People worried about the industry drowning itself in a storm of
competition for space on the radio waves, and that regulation was necessary in order to ensure
the proper allocation of resources among these competitors (Hazlett, 2018).
By 1952, these policies enabled a few major networks to control 95 percent of all radio
stations in the United States (Matzko, 2021). As radio broadcasts declined in popularity, these
major networks began to shift their capital investments to television. This left some openings in
the radio industry for independent broadcasters, many of whom leaned strongly to the political
right. A new generation of radio broadcasters deemed the Radio Right emerged rapidly and
began attacking left-leaning Americans as communists and traitors during and shortly after the
McCarthy Red Scare. As the Radio Right grew more popular in the early 1960s, the FCC began
to enforce a set of rules known as the Fairness Doctrine, which stipulated that in order to keep
their licenses, radio broadcasters needed to give equal attention to opposing viewpoints on their
programs. As a result, direct criticism of Democrats, particularly the Democratic politicians in
power at the time of the Fairness Doctrine’s implementation, became riskier and costlier to
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members of the Radio Right. Many radio station owners outright dropped conservative
broadcasters because those broadcasters jeopardized their ability to maintain their licenses.
Over the next several decades, the Fairness Doctrine was gradually dismantled and
conservative broadcasters made a comeback (Matzko, 2021). However, the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 ushered in a new era of even more advanced media consolidation. Corcoran (2016)
writes, “In 1983, 50 companies owned 90% U.S. media. Since the Telecommunications Act of
1996, the act that reduced the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations on cross
ownership, 90% of US media, is owned by 6 companies.” The Telecommunications Act of 1996
eliminated the cap on the number of media companies that a parent company can own, which
allowed larger companies to buy up hundreds of smaller ones. This law is intended to be an
amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, which initially created the FCC to regulate
media companies and radio broadcasting.
In summary, this timeline establishes how consolidation began with the FRC and FCC
being created to determine who is allowed to use certain communications technologies, and was
most recently solidified through the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Due to this chain of
events, six companies now own 90 percent of American media companies, and those companies
(along with the Big Tech members) receive copious subsidies from state and federal
governments. State and federal subsidies grant Big Tech and the six major owners an advantage
over the media market, which enables them to unfairly maintain dominance over their
competitors. This presents a problem for users because their options for media consumption and
social media platforms are all funded and controlled by the same sources, so those options are
extremely limited and homogeneous. If users are dissatisfied with or banned from using a certain
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platform, moving to another platform is not always a legitimate option because that platform is
likely controlled and moderated by the same parent company.
Therefore, once again, there are practical consequences for the quality of our democracy
regardless of whether or not these corporations’ behavior is legal. For much of our history, the
government was the only entity that was powerful enough to engage in large-scale censorship.
Now, due to media consolidation, the members of Big Tech also have that power, and it is clearly
leading to a self-feeding cycle of political polarization. It may or may not be legal for these
companies to have some of the same powers as the government, and it may or may not be legal
for them to censor, label, and ban users from their platforms based on users’ political opinions,
but the consequences are obvious. The same behavior in which governments engaged throughout
the 20th century led to the same polarization issues that we see now in the 21st-century United
States; only this time, the polarization is a result of corporate action and is not explicitly
sponsored by the government. When compared to historical accounts, the consequences for our
social and political lives are the same as they would have been if an authoritarian state rather
than a corporation engaged in mass censorship. That is why this issue demands our full attention.

Case Studies
The following case studies from various time periods in China, Russia, and the United
States demonstrate that censorship can take many forms, but it generally impacts people in the
same way no matter its form. Censorship exacerbates affective polarization in every case studied
in this section, and leads to ideological polarization in some notable cases. Affective polarization
is denoted by instances of violence, coercion, and other negative behaviors towards the targets of
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censorship. Ideological polarization is denoted by an increasing ideological divide between the
targets and the perpetrators of censorship, and an inability to agree on basic truths.

I.

China

Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution began in 1966, with the intention of eliminating
capitalism and traditional Chinese culture, and replacing those systems with the Maoist ideology
(Lamb, 2005). Chairman Mao wanted to implement communism in its purest form, as he
believed that pure communism would enable the proletariat revolutionaries to thrive without
oppression from a wealthy ruling class. His regime encouraged members of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to identify class enemies, who were vaguely-defined as those who
expressed anti-revolutionary sentiments or who were simply not fervent enough in their support
of Maoism; however, there was no official protocol by which the CCP sought out and eliminated
dissenters. This led to infighting among CCP members who accused each other of being class
traitors, and violence erupted between coworkers, friends, neighbors, and family members as
they struggled to prove their loyalty. Newspapers encouraged unions of workers and peasants to
overthrow authority figures who lacked enthusiasm for the revolutionary cause. Millions were
sentenced to years of labor in reeducation camps so they could be molded into proper Maoists.
The Mao regime’s encouragement of censorship led to highly combative, accusatory
political discourse. One young student, Rae Yang, recounts the impact of her revolutionary fervor
in her memoir, Spider Eaters (1997). She explains that Chairman Mao’s ideology delivered a
message of empowerment: people who are traditionally expected to submit to authority, such as
students and children, were strongly encouraged to defy orders from teachers and parents who
did not appear to support the revolutionary cause. Consequently, when the opportunity arose to
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accuse her schoolteacher of simply lacking enthusiasm for the revolution, she rallied her
classmates. They searched her home for evidence of dissent and posted a dazibao (a poster
expressing dissatisfaction with an authority figure (Kluver, 2021) on the teacher’s bedroom wall
in order to shame her into changing her thinking.
In another memoir, Under The Red Sun (1968), Fan Cao describes her conflicts with her
parents as a teenager who also felt empowered by Maoist rhetoric. During the Cultural
Revolution, people were led to believe that Chairman Mao was a god who would lead them to
save the world and liberate humanity from the oppression of the capitalist class. Children were
taught to worship Mao, even if it meant defying their parents. Fan Cao’s parents were university
administrators, and thus part of the privileged intellectual class that was automatically
anti-revolutionary. As the daughter of so-called class enemies, she became a target of relentless
bullying and abuse by her classmates and other fervent revolutionaries. Desperate to prove her
loyalty to the Maoist ideology, she wrote a dazibao and publicly denounced her parents.
When people are automatically guilty until proven innocent, they go to extremes to
distance themselves from any implication of guilt. The Mao regime gave a somewhat vague
criteria for guilt; while it included some specific categories of people (intellectuals, the wealthy,
and pro-establishment, anti-revolutionary authority figures), people’s loyalty could be questioned
for a crime as small as failing to display adequate enthusiasm for the regime. Thus, all citizens
had a positive duty to be as expressive as possible, and an easy way to confirm one’s loyalty in
the absence of any definite measures was to compare oneself to people who could be proven less
enthusiastic. As the cases of Rae Yang and Fan Cao demonstrate, children and teenagers became
desperate to prove their loyalty to the revolutionary cause primarily when pressured by their
peers. They are galvanized into action when their status among their peers is threatened. If Rae
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Yang had not joined her classmates in denouncing their teacher, her classmates would likely have
turned on her and accused her of sympathizing with a class enemy. Likewise, if Fan Cao had not
denounced her parents, her classmates’ bullying would have continued. In this way, the Mao
regime fostered aggressive, accusatory political discourse by encouraging people to attack those
who expressed either the wrong opinions or failed to express the right ones. These anecdotes also
demonstrate that privately-enforced censorship can be every bit as destructive to a society as
government-enforced censorship, especially when a government supports the censorship efforts
of private entities.
In the 21st century, China seems to have come a long way from attacking citizens who
express dissatisfaction with their government. However, it is arguable that the Chinese
government has simply gotten better at hiding its censorship efforts from the public. Censorship
manifests in many complex ways in present-day China. Xu and Albert (2017) report that the
Chinese government uses subtler tactics such as libel lawsuits alongside more blatant tools such
as arrests and blocking sites in order to prevent citizens from accessing and spreading potentially
“dangerous” information. Even though China’s constitution supposedly protects citizens’ rights
to freedom of expression, the Chinese government frequently punishes citizens for endangering
the country by exposing state secrets, for which there is no official definition. The Chinese
government employs over a dozen different departments that control the flow of information
through the country, along with over two million public opinion analysts who monitor people’s
internet posts and searches. The government also uses a variety of tactics to suppress journalists,
such as “dismissals and demotions, libel lawsuits, fines, arrests, and forced television
confessions” (Xu and Albert, 2017).
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In 2009, The Guardian reported that Chinese journalist Liu Xiaobo had been sentenced to
eleven years in prison after publishing Charter 08, an appeal for political liberalization and an
end to the CCP’s dominance. During a two-hour trial, Liu was accused of subverting the
government through his calls for a constitutional amendment, separation of powers in the
government, republican governance, and free and fair elections. Most Chinese citizens were
unaware of his arrest and of the publication of Charter 08, because various government agencies
blocked access to subversive information. When Liu was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in
2010, the Chinese government arrested any journalists, writers, and other citizens who celebrated
his achievement or expressed anger at his imprisonment (Reporters Without Borders, 2010).
In 2010, the Chinese government arrested another journalist, Tan Zuoren, for “criticizing
the Chinese Communist Party and the government through his articles and diaries posted on-line
and on overseas websites concerning the authorities’ handling of the Tiananmen crackdown in
1989” (Amnesty International, 2010). Tan’s arrest incited angry reactions from human rights
defenders worldwide, and his trial was reported to be grossly unfair. His lawyers were prevented
from presenting their witnesses, the evidence they had prepared, and their defense. Journalists
from both China and Hong Kong were threatened, detained, and barred from covering the trial.
The court sentenced Tan to five years in prison after delaying his trial for four months without
any explanation.
During Mao Zedong’s regime, the Chinese Communist Party relied more on citizens to
police each other’s speech than on direct government censorship. This has changed over the past
several decades, as the CCP now prefers to police citizens itself. What has not changed, though,
is the rhetoric that the CCP uses to justify censorship; in the 1960s and the 2010s, the CCP
justified its censorship by claiming that dissenting opinions put others in danger. The Maoist
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ideology pushed the narrative that people who did not support the Cultural Revolution
sympathized with oppressive establishment authority figures. Their lack of enthusiasm was said
to betray their desire to continue profiting off the oppression of the proletariat class. In recent
years, the CCP has changed its narrative to argue that dissenting opinions threaten China’s
national security. People who question the government are accused of endangering state secrets
and other sensitive national security information, albeit in the absence of any formal definition of
what constitutes a state secret. Thus, the CCP has given itself free reign to label any information
it dislikes as a threat to national security, because the definition of a state secret cannot be
formally challenged.
II.

Soviet Union/Russia

One of the defining features of Soviet-era communist censorship was its relentless
persecution of artists who expressed disagreement with government decisions. Early on in the
1930s, Stalin’s regime set guidelines for distinguishing acceptable art from unacceptable art
(Wallach, 1991). Artists and other creatives who did anything other than worship Stalin through
their work were imprisoned or killed. Thus, much like citizens under Maoist China, artists in the
Soviet Union had a positive duty to glorify their leadership, and could not create any works that
expressed disagreement with Stalin’s regime or that depicted neutral subject matter. If artists did
not encourage blind Stalin worship, they were considered enemies of the state, even if their work
was not subversive or political. Especially in the early years of the Soviet Union, censorship was
used as a tool to control the culture of the public and prevent ideological clashes from
destabilizing the new communist regime (Markwick, 1935). The Bolsheviks could not afford to
lose any revolutionary progress to dissenting political opinions.
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Author and World War II veteran Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was arrested in 1945 for
“criticizing Stalin in private correspondence” and sentenced to eight years of hard labor,
followed by permanent exile (The Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn Center, 2021). These experiences
motivated him to write a three-volume series titled The Gulag Archipelago, which describes his
and other prisoners’ experiences in Soviet labor camps (Pearce, 2011). Even before its
publication, the text was heavily censored, and needed to be hidden carefully from the KGB (the
Russian Committee For State Security). When the KGB found out about Solzhenitsyn’s work in
progress in 1965, they confiscated the text, determined to keep the truth about the communist
regime hidden from public view. Solzhenitsyn and his friend Arnold Susi worked together in
secret to make copies of the text. Susi and his daughter held the master copy in Estonia, away
from the KGB, until the fall of the Soviet Union, while Solzhenitsyn smuggled a microfilmed
copy into France. The text was first published in France in 1973, and translations in other
languages followed soon after in 1974. In the decades since its publication, The Gulag
Archipelago has been heralded as a literary masterpiece that gave a voice to those oppressed
under communism (Wheatcroft, 1996). Malia (1977) writes that The Gulag Archipelago revealed
the truth about Soviet labor camps to the West, and confirmed many Americans’ and Western
Europeans’ suspicions about the ills of communism.
Another writer, Osip Mandelstam, was arrested and exiled to Cherdyn for writing a poem
titled “Stalin Epigram” in 1934 (Mandelstam, 1971). The poem describes Stalin and his
supporters in an unflattering manner, and emphasizes the ways in which Stalin delighted in using
fear and harsh punishments to control the population. Notably, Mandelstam only read this poem
to a few close friends at private gatherings--it was not formally published. He was arrested by
NKVD (the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) officers in the months after he presented
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this poem, which arouses suspicions that people at these gatherings may have informed the
NKVD about his heretical works (Shentalinsky, 1995). Given the climate of social and political
tension that Mandelstam describes in his poem, as well as the harsh punishments (exile, hard
labor, and execution) imposed upon political dissenters, it would not be unreasonable to suspect
that those who attended Mandelstam’s gatherings feared punishment for being complicit in an
expression of disloyalty.
Stalin’s regime, and the subsequent iterations of communist rule in the USSR, relied
much more heavily on direct state censorship than on citizens censoring each other. If a person
was suspected to be a class enemy or a counterrevolutionary, state actors would subject that
person to a formal punishment such as arrest, exile, torture, hard labor, or execution
(Alexopoulos, 2008). Like the Maoists, the Bolsheviks placed a strong emphasis on class
alignment in their society. However, this focus on class expressed itself differently from the way
it presented in China. Those who were most loyal to the proletariat cause became Communist
Party leaders, and they were entrusted with the responsibility of rounding up those who were
deemed class enemies (often wealthier landowners, capitalists, and intellectuals). Ordinary
citizens who lacked political influence were not expected to dole out punishments in the same
way that they were in China. However, ordinary citizens still tended to refrain from expressing
counterrevolutionary sentiments even amongst themselves, because the Bolsheviks punished
entire families for the actions of one person. Both Osip Mandelstam and his wife Nadezhda
Mandelstam were punished for the former’s presentation of poetry that insulted Stalin, even
though Nadezhda had not participated in the poem’s creation.
In 2021, Russia is no longer strictly communist, but the nation still engages in heavy
censorship efforts. In recent years, the Russian government has dramatically increased its
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censorship of the internet. Internet service providers are required to install software that allows
the government to block certain types of content in Russia (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Internet
users who purchase VPNs (virtual private networks) are subjected to harsh fines, since VPNs
allow users to access blocked content. Telecommunications and internet companies are
encouraged to store information about their users and track their private messages in order to
preemptively catch terrorists. In the same way that the Chinese government justifies censorship
by arguing that dissenting opinions threaten China’s national security, the Russian government
justifies censorship by arguing that mass surveillance is needed to protect state secrets and,
ironically, “the privacy of Russian users” (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The Russian
government’s overarching goal is to pass legislation that places internet access completely under
government control, which would cut Russian internet access off from the outside world.
On November 1, 2019, the “sovereign internet law” went into effect in Russia (German
Council On Foreign Relations, 2020). This “law” is actually a series of amendments to existing
laws governing communications, and dramatically expands the Russian government’s authority
to monitor citizens’ internet use and block their access to certain websites. The first of these
amendments requires all internet service providers to install technical equipment that restricts
citizens’ access to certain websites and information that could potentially threaten Russia’s
national security. The second of these amendments allows the media regulator Roskomnadzor to
take control of the internet in an “emergency.” The third amendment creates a Russian national
Domain Name System (DNS), which “would segregate Russian websites from the international
DNS, making them unavailable in all other parts of the world” (German Council On Foreign
Relations, 2020). Human rights groups fear that these amendments could be used to identify,
track, and persecute dissenters, especially because Russia has a long history of persecuting
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journalists (Kennedy, 2019). These groups point out that these amendments give the Russian
government immense power over people’s access to information, which would limit their ability
to understand and express dissenting opinions.
Additionally, in its efforts to prevent the spread of “dangerous” information, the Russian
government has reportedly murdered 27 journalists since 2002 (Aliaksandrau, 2014). The
Committee To Protect Journalists (CPJ) (2009) reports that there is considerable evidence to
support the idea that the Russian government ordered the murder of Natalya Estemirova in 2009.
She was a regular contributor to two independent newspapers, Novaya Gazeta and Kavazsky
Uzel, and a strong advocate for the “Moscow-based human rights group Memorial and a
consultant for the New York-based international rights group Human Rights Watch” (CPJ, 2009).
She frequently reported on human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings, concentration
camps, and punitive arsons committed by local governments, and was the fifth journalist who
investigated these events to be killed since 2000. Her daughter, Lana Estemirova, writes that in
the decade since her mother’s death, the human rights movement in Chechnya has been forced
into hiding, and local authorities are bolder than ever in their violent persecution of human rights
activists (2019). Natalya Estemirova’s murderers have still not been revealed or indicted.
Though the Russian constitution explicitly guarantees “the right to privacy... freedom of
opinion and the right to freely search, receive, transmit, produce, and disseminate information”
(Human Rights Watch, 2019), the Russian government routinely finds ways around these
provisions. As evidenced in the case of Natalya Estemirova’s efforts, the Russian government’s
continued persecution of those with dissenting opinions has pushed various movements
underground. Human rights and anti-war activists are forced to conduct their operations in secret,
which heightens tensions between the government and its citizens. On this front, the effects of
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current Russian policies differ very little from the effects of those which the USSR implemented.
During the Soviet era, people were also forced to express their opinions underground, but even
that carried a significant risk. The Soviet government harshly punished those who were
suspected of being complicit in anti-communist activities, so people often reported each other to
avoid being punished for associating with anti-communists, as the Mandelstams’ story
demonstrates.
III.

United States

Americans like to believe that the US Constitution’s protection of free expression under
the Bill Of Rights adequately sets the United States apart from countries which openly silence
dissent, such as Russia or China. However, the United States also has a long history of censoring
dissenting opinions. In 1918, the US had recently entered World War I, and many Americans
disapproved of the war and the military draft (Boyd, 2009). President Woodrow Wilson wanted
to prevent anti-war activists from dividing the country on the issue of the war when he believed
it was best for the country to stay united. Therefore, the act outlawed any speech or expression
that could be considered an incitement of disloyalty to the military, government, and the
Constitution, as well as speech or expression in support of the United States’ adversaries in the
war. The penalties for violating the Sedition Act were fines of up to $10,000 and up to twenty
years in prison.
Keith (2001) writes that many Americans believed that World War I was primarily fought
on the home front, not in terms of fighting foreign enemies, but in terms of the division which
the war and the ensuing Sedition Act stoked between Americans. The draft was immensely
unpopular among Americans, with almost 4 million men refusing to register. Almost 340,000
men deserted the army. Opposition to the draft was especially strong in the American South, and
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it reached such tremendous heights that governors in the Southern states requested federal troops
to help them arrest bands of armed deserters. Both white and black southerners opposed the war
for ideological reasons, believing that the war supported economic interests that conflicted with
their own and that they should not be forced to support the war effort for that reason.
Furthermore, southern draft boards frequently selected poor whites and black men for service,
while middle to upper-class white men were largely able to avoid conscription. For this reason,
the draft exacerbated race and class conflicts in the South, resulting in evasion, desertion, and
violent conflicts.
The McCarthy Red Scare in the 1950s also led to a significant increase in political
conflict. Gibson (1988) writes, “A host of actions against Communists was taken by the states,
including disqualifying them from public employment (including from teaching positions in
public schools); denying them access to the ballot as candidates, and prohibiting them from
serving in public office even if legally elected; requiring Communists to register with the
government; and outright bans on the Party.” Arkansas and Texas went as far as banning the
Communist Party altogether and required all Communists to register themselves with the
government. All of these measures eventually eliminated the Communist Party in the United
States and caused over ten thousand employees to be fired from their jobs. About half of
American university professors expressed anxiety over the prospect of being persecuted for their
political beliefs.
The United States has a history of political persecution nearly as vicious as that of openly
authoritarian governments such as China and Russia. The US Constitution supposedly protects
Americans’ rights to free speech through the First Amendment, but federal and state
governments have trampled on those rights on at least two major occasions, and certainly more.
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Just as the Russian constitution does not appear to protect journalists from censorship despite
forbidding direct government censorship, the US government has historically revoked its
citizens’ constitutionally-protected rights to political dissent. Though the United States has a
very different form of government than China and Russia, it has still engaged in mass
persecution of minority groups. Many Americans are reluctant to call their government’s
behavior authoritarian because they believe it could, and has, never happened on their soil, but
the disturbing reality is that the US government has indeed engaged in authoritarian, even fascist
behavior by partnering with private entities to suppress political dissent. My ensuing analysis
will show that the line between Soviet, Chinese Communist Party, and US government
persecution of political dissenters is in reality quite thin, despite many Americans’ lofty
perceptions of their republican government. Under the right conditions, and if citizens fail to
remain vigilant, the United States could very easily slip into the same traps that Russia and China
have.
In recent years, through President Trump’s term and into President Biden’s term,
conservatives and libertarians have expressed increasing concern about the censorship of their
ideas by the group of technology corporations known as Big Tech (mostly Facebook, Twitter,
Apple, and Google). Critics argue that posts by Republicans are fact-checked, removed, or
flagged as false much more often than are posts by Democrats; and indeed, some studies have
shown that posts by Republicans are up to three times more likely to be fact-checked than are
posts by Democrats (Conan, 2012). This perception that Democrats are censored less often
angers Republicans and makes them resentful of Democrats. To further emphasize the extent to
which Republicans believe that Big Tech and the mainstream media are stacked against them,
according to a 2017 study by the Cato Institute, over half of Americans believe that most
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mainstream news organizations have a liberal ideological bias (Ekins). Fox News was the only
major media outlet that respondents perceived as having a strong conservative ideological bias.
Republicans’ concerns over Big Tech censorship and liberal media bias peaked in
January of 2021 when almost every major social media platform banned President Trump for
“inciting violence” and when Apple and the Google Play store threatened to remove Parler from
their platforms unless Parler developed a plan to monitor its (overwhelmingly Republican) users’
speech. Thousands of conservatives and libertarians expressed outrage and concern over the
immense power that these corporations demonstrated through their willingness to ban users for
what these users perceived as differences in political ideology. To the Republicans who took
offense at Trump’s bans from major social media platforms and at Parler’s removal from the
Apple and Google Play stores, these events indicated that Big Tech has an anti-right agenda,
especially considering the fact that Big Tech took very little action to censor calls for violent
action among Black Lives Matter activists all through the summer of 2020.

Historical Analysis

I.

Methods

For this study, I chose to analyze cases from China, Russia, and the United States because
they are not commonly included in studies of censorship, especially when compared to countries
with obvious authoritarian histories such as Cuba, Germany, and North Korea. Both older and
younger Americans know very well the dangers that authoritarian censorship posed in those
countries, but many younger Americans in particular are less familiar with the dangerous history
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of censorship in China, Russia, and even in their home country, the United States. Americans
like to wave their country’s history of questionable censorship practices aside because freedom
of speech is supposedly protected under the first amendment of the US Constitution. However,
censorship has historically been, and currently is, very much an issue in the United States,
though Americans like to believe their country’s unique democratic-republic qualities protect
them from this type of government overreach. Similarly, many Americans know that China is
still authoritarian, but it has made such considerable progress since the 1960s that they
underestimate the amount of censorship which government and citizen actors perpetuate. Lastly,
academics tend not to give Russia’s violently authoritarian history the attention it deserves,
especially in recent years with the emerging popularity of Marxism-Leninism in academia. This
study intends to reiterate the realities of Soviet censorship policies as they were experienced by
real individuals who lived under that regime. Overall, these countries were selected for the study
because their histories are at high risk of being romanticized or forgotten by newer generations.
Specific cases of censorship within these countries were selected based on the following
criteria:
● Availability of firsthand accounts
● Availability of information about citizen and/or government reactions to
censorship efforts, which could be perpetrated by either government or citizen
actors
● Time period within a country’s history
● Case can be clearly proven as an instance of censorship
For this study, I wanted to include two cases that came from a time period that was known to be
repressive (the Mao regime in China, the Stalin regime in Russia, and World War I and the
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McCarthy Red Scare in the United States), and two cases that came from a more recent time
period (from 2000 to the present) in which ongoing repression tends to be overlooked and
understated. I did not include two present-day cases from the United States because most
present-day cases of censorship in the United States are highly disputed, and because one of the
objectives of this paper is to create a set of criteria and expectations by which to evaluate
present-day cases of censorship in the US and their impacts on American society.
The following chart (Figure A) summarizes each case presented in this study. The
historical analysis section of this study will identify and analyze trends in each of these cases in
order to determine the impact of different kinds of censorship efforts on political polarization.
Figure A
Country

Time Period

Event

China

Mao regime

Schoolteacher lacks
enthusiasm for revolution

China

Mao regime

Girl abused by fervent
revolutionaries for her
parents’ occupations

China

2000-present

Journalist arrested for
exposing human rights abuses

China

2000-present

Journalist arrested for
exposing human rights abuses

Russia

Stalin regime

Man arrested for criticizing
government in private
correspondence

Russia

Stalin regime

Man arrested for criticizing
government in private
correspondence

Russia

2000-present

Government passes law to
restrict access to “bad”
information on the internet
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Russia

2000-present

Government murders a
journalist

United States

World War I

Government passes law
against criticizing a war

United States

McCarthy Red Scare

State governments pass laws
targeting suspected
communists

This historical analysis will count up instances (labeled “events” in the figure above and
figures below) of censorship and political repression incited by government and citizen actors,
and categorize citizens’ reactions to censorship efforts. In section II of this historical analysis, to
determine the prevalence of affective polarization, reactions will be classified as “hostile to
government,” “(citizens) hostile to citizens,” “not specified,” “positive to government,” or
“(citizens) positive to citizens.” Citizens’ reactions are determined to be “hostile to government”
and “hostile to citizens” if they express dissatisfaction with government or citizen actions either
verbally or through their actions. For the purposes of this study, dissatisfaction with government
or citizen actions includes participation in protests, violation of government or private property,
verbal or physical assault, publication of countering viewpoints in media, and deliberately hiding
one’s beliefs from government or citizen actors. Citizens’ reactions are determined to be
“positive to government” or “positive to citizens” if they express support for government or
citizen actions either verbally or through their actions. For the purposes of this study, support for
government or citizen actions includes rallying in support of a cause or publication of praise in
the media. Citizens’ reactions are determined to be “not specified” if a case study does not
discuss the ways in which citizens reacted to censorship efforts by governments or by other
citizens.
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Then, governments’ reactions to these citizen reactions to the inciting event will be
categorized as “hostile to citizens,” “not specified,” or “positive to citizens.” Government
reactions are determined to be “hostile to citizens” if they use coercion, violence, or force to
prevent citizens from expressing dissatisfaction with the actions of their governments or fellow
citizens. For the purposes of this study, hostile government actions include legal prosecution,
arrests, imprisonment, torture, execution, and murder. Government reactions are determined to
be “positive to citizens” if they encourage citizens to express dissatisfaction with the actions of
their governments or fellow citizens. For the purposes of this study, positive government
reactions include passing legislation that upholds freedom of expression and publishing
viewpoints in the media that encourage freedom of expression. Government reactions are
determined to be “not specified” if a case study does not discuss the ways in which governments
reacted to citizen reactions to an inciting event.
In section III of this historical analysis, to determine the prevalence of ideological
polarization, citizen and government reactions will be classified as “repressive (citizens),”
“repressive (government),” “resistant,” “supportive (government),” “neutral,” or “not specified.”
Citizen reactions to inciting events are determined to be repressive toward other citizens if they
use coercion, violence, or force to prevent other citizens from expressing their opinions. For the
purposes of this study, repressive actions toward other citizens include participation in protests,
violation of private property, and verbal or physical assault. Government reactions to citizen
reactions to inciting events are determined to be repressive toward citizens with the same criteria.
For the purposes of this study, repressive government actions include legal prosecution, arrests,
imprisonment, torture, execution, and murder. Citizen reactions to inciting events are determined
to be resistant if they express disagreement either verbally or through their actions with
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censorship that governments or other citizens impose upon them via the inciting event. For the
purposes of this study, resistant actions toward governments or other citizens include
participation in protests, violation of government or private property, verbal or physical assault,
publication of countering viewpoints in media, and deliberately hiding one’s beliefs from
government or citizen actors. Citizens’ reactions to inciting events, as well as governments’
reactions to citizens’ reactions, will be classified as neutral if a case study makes it clear that
neither governments nor citizens preferred to take action in one way or another, or that they felt
indifferent to the inciting event. Citizen and government reactions will be classified as “not
specified” if a case study does not discuss their reactions.
The following chart (Figure B) outlines the basic formula that sections II and III of this
historical analysis follow:
Figure B

Lastly, for each section on affective polarization and ideological polarization, this study
will break down different categories of reactions as a percentage of total reactions studied. This
will determine which categories of reactions to censorship are most common, given the presence
of either affective or ideological polarization.
Section IV of this historical analysis will determine whether ideological and affective
polarization overlap. This is important because it will help to reveal the nuances of the
relationships between censorship and polarization. Identifying the type of polarization that
results from different kinds of censorship efforts will help us understand how and why citizens
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react in certain ways, and how censorship can damage citizens’ relationships with one another
and with their government.
Overall, results will be determined by the presence of government and citizen reactions,
both to the inciting event and to each other’s reactions to the inciting event, which lead to a
vicious cycle of repression and resistance between governments and citizens. The main objective
of the study is to demonstrate a cause and effect relationship between censorship and political
polarization. I hypothesize that censorship efforts by either government or citizen actors will
evoke hostile and resistant reactions from certain citizens, and that those hostile and resistant
reactions will evoke even more hostility and repressive efforts from the inciting government and
citizen actors. I will know my hypothesis is supported if I see citizens reacting with hostility and
resistance to censorship efforts, and if I see governments reacting with hostility to those citizens’
reactions.

II.

Affective Polarization

Affective polarization is defined as partisan polarization that stems from negative feelings
toward a different political group (Iyengar et al., 2019). The following table (Table A)
categorizes the reactions of citizens and government actors as hostile to citizens, hostile to
government, positive toward citizens, positive toward government, or not specified. This
categorization makes it easier to see how the censorship events studied in China, Russia, and the
United States impacted citizens’ relationships with each other, as well as governments’
relationships with citizens. By understanding how various censorship efforts impacted citizens’
and governments’ relationships, we can understand how censorship impacts affective
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polarization. This table is intended to establish a relationship between the inciting event and the
affectively-motivated reactions between governments and citizens.
Table A
Country

Event

China

Citizens’
Reactions

Category of
Reaction
(Citizen)

Government
’s Reactions

Category of
Reaction
(Governmen
t)

Schoolteache Shame
r lacks
teacher for
enthusiasm
beliefs
for revolution

Hostile to
other citizens

Not specified

Not specified

China

Girl abused
Shame
by fervent
parents for
revolutionarie occupations
s for her
parents’
occupations

Hostile to
other citizens

Not specified

Not specified

China

Journalist
arrested for
exposing
human rights
abuses

Not specified

Not specified

Continues
persecution
of journalists
who spread
“bad”
information

Hostile to
citizens

China

Journalist
arrested for
exposing
human rights
abuses

Outrage at
injustice

Hostile to
government

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Hostile to
citizens

Russia

Man arrested
for criticizing
government
in private
corresponden
ce

Subtle
continued
resistance to
government

Hostile to
government

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Hostile to
citizens

Russia

Man arrested
for criticizing
government
in private

Reported
man to
government

Hostile to
other citizens

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Hostile to
citizens
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corresponden
ce
Russia

Government
Human rights
passes law to groups react
restrict access angrily
to “bad”
information
on the
internet

Hostile to
government

Not specified

Not specified

Russia

Government
murders a
journalist

Human rights
advocates are
forced
underground

Hostile to
government

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Hostile to
citizens

United States

Government
passes law
against
criticizing a
war

Citizens
desert the
military,
evade the
draft, and
protest the
war

Hostile to
government

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Hostile to
citizens

United States

State
governments
pass laws
targeting
suspected
communists

Citizens
discriminate
against each
other based
on political
beliefs

Hostile to
other citizens

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Hostile to
citizens

According to Iyengar (2019), people form strongly emotional group identities based on
the party or political group with which they identify. When another group expresses beliefs
contrary to those of one’s own group, it feels threatening to a core part of a person’s identity. The
person’s own political group becomes the in-group, and other political groups become
out-groups. Affective divisions grow stronger the more a person identifies with his or her own
group, because to identify emotionally with one group automatically means distancing oneself
from opposing groups that do not offer the same emotional fulfillment.
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This is clearly visible in Table A, which shows that when an opposing group takes hostile
action toward a tightly-knit, highly emotionally-bonded political group, the latter group nearly
always responds with hostility. The initial hostile action does not need to be particularly drastic
in order to elicit a hostile response from the targeted party; the triggering events studied in this
paper range from murder to a simple lack of expressed allegiance to a group. In most of the
situations in Table A, an event, either a government or citizen action, causes harm or offense to
an emotionally-bonded political group, then the group reacts negatively toward the government
or other citizen groups, and then the government reacts by encouraging even more persecution of
the offended group. This becomes a vicious cycle of suppression, resistance, and more
suppression. Because we see this cycle represented in Table A, my hypothesis that censorship
causes affective polarization is supported.
To understand these results, it is helpful to break down different kinds of affective
reactions and how they result from different kinds of inciting events. The following table (Table
B) shows the affective reactions of citizens and governments to various censorship efforts as a
share of total government and citizen reactions studied (20 reactions). This gives us a sense of
how prevalent different kinds of affective reactions to censorship are. The data in this table is a
summation of the data from Table A.
Table B
Category of
Reaction

Number of
Instances

Total Number of
Government and
Citizen Reactions

Reaction as
Percentage of Total
Government and
Citizen Reactions

(Citizens) Hostile to
government

5

20

25%

(Government) Hostile 7
to citizens

20

35%
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(Citizens) Hostile to
other citizens

4

20

20%

Not specified

4

20

20%

(Citizens) Positive to
citizens

0

20

0%

(Government)
Positive to citizens

0

20

0%

(Citizens) Positive to
government

0

20

0%

III.

Ideological Polarization

Ideological polarization is defined as the extent to which political beliefs differ among
various groups (Dimock et al., 2014). Ideological polarization is more difficult to identify in
these case studies, so the following table (Table C) will identify specific markers of increased
ideological polarization (persecution on the basis of ideology or beliefs) that result from either
citizen or government censorship efforts. This table will indicate whether government and citizen
reactions to an event increased, decreased, did not affect ideological polarization, or whether the
reaction was not specified (when it is unclear whether these reactions impacted ideological
polarization). Citizen and government reactions to censorship efforts will be categorized as
repressive (for governments and citizens repressing other citizens), resistant (for citizens
resisting government imposition of an ideology), neutral, and supportive. This table is intended
to establish a relationship between the inciting event and the ideologically-motivated reactions of
citizens and governments.
Table C
Country

Event

Citizens’
Reactions

Category of
Reaction

Government
’s Reactions

Category of
Reaction
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(Citizen)

(Governmen
t)

China

Schoolteache Shame
r lacks
teacher for
enthusiasm
beliefs
for revolution

Repressive

Not specified

Not specified

China

Girl abused
Shame
by fervent
parents for
revolutionarie occupations
s for her
parents’
occupations

Repressive

Not specified

Not specified

China

Journalist
arrested for
exposing
human rights
abuses

Not specified

Not specified

Continues
persecution
of journalists
who spread
“bad”
information

Repressive

China

Journalist
arrested for
exposing
human rights
abuses

Outrage at
injustice

Resistant

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Repressive

Russia

Man arrested
for criticizing
government
in private
corresponden
ce

Subtle
continued
resistance to
government

Resistant

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Repressive

Russia

Man arrested
for criticizing
government
in private
corresponden
ce

Reported
man to
government

Repressive

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Repressive

Russia

Government
Human rights
passes law to groups react
restrict access angrily
to “bad”
information

Resistant

Not specified

Not specified
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on the
internet
Russia

Government
murders a
journalist

Human rights
advocates are
forced
underground

Resistant

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Repressive

United States

Government
passes law
against
criticizing a
war

Citizens
desert the
military,
evade the
draft, and
protest the
war

Resistant

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Repressive

United States

State
governments
pass laws
targeting
suspected
communists

Citizens
discriminate
against each
other based
on political
beliefs

Repressive

Doubles
down on
ideological
dissenters

Repressive

Here, we see a similar back-and-forth pattern between reactions to ideological conflict as
was observed with affective conflict. When the government or citizens repress other citizens, and
those citizens resist, the government and certain groups of citizens repress the resistant citizens.
Because we see this pattern, my hypothesis with respect to ideological polarization is supported.
This is also consistent with the findings of other studies on ideological polarization: ideological
polarization leads to significant conflict in people’s everyday lives. According to Dimock et al.
(2014), people who are most involved in politics tend to display the highest degrees of
ideological polarization, while people who are less involved tend not to be so ideologically
polarized. Ideological extremists often view the other side as a direct threat to their community’s
or nation’s well-being, going far beyond simple dislike of other opinions. In my study,
journalists, writers, and political commentators experienced the most direct conflict with their
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governments and with other citizens over ideological differences, but ideological polarization
also made casualties out of ordinary citizens who did not necessarily want to be involved in
politics. For instance, under Mao’s regime, ideological extremists targeted teachers and
schoolchildren specifically for being politically moderate. Thus, ideological polarization is not
always a back-and-forth struggle between the most engaged political actors; they can drag
moderates into their battles as well, either by scapegoating them or accusing them of political
extremism.
In this way, the results of my study are not surprising at all. If ideological extremists
(both citizen and government actors) view those who disagree with them as a threat to
themselves and their communities, then it makes sense that they would fall into a vicious cycle
of repression and resistance. In nearly all of these cases, citizens are being censored either by
other citizens or by their governments, and they respond to that censorship negatively. Whether
imposed by ideological extremists onto other ideological extremists, or by ideological extremists
onto moderates, censorship motivates the repressed to continue resisting instead of changing
their policy preferences. Similarly, resistance by the repressed group leads to even more
repression by the opposing group. My study clearly demonstrates the backlash effect (Klein,
2018), which postulates that countering or censoring strong partisans’ beliefs only motivates
them to double down on their ideals.
As with affective polarization, it is helpful to break down different kinds of
ideologically-motivated reactions and show how they result from different kinds of censorship
efforts. The following table (Table D) shows the ideologically-based reactions of citizens and
governments to various censorship efforts as a share of total government and citizen reactions
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studied (20). This gives us a sense of how prevalent different kinds of ideologically-motivated
reactions to censorship are. The data in this table is a summation of the data from Table C.
Table D
Category of
Reaction

Number of
Instances

Total Number of
Government and
Citizen Reactions

Reaction as
Percentage of Total
Government and
Citizen Reactions

Repressive
(Government)

7

20

35%

Repressive (Citizens)

4

20

20%

Resistant

5

20

25%

Neutral

0

20

0%

Supportive

0

20

0%

Not specified

4

20

20%

IV.

Prevalence of Affective vs. Ideological Polarization

Lastly, in order to understand the nature of the polarization that results from censorship,
we will determine where overlap exists between ideological and affective polarization in these
cases. This will allow us to better diagnose censorship-related issues and generate policy
solutions that address more specific problems instead of polarization in general. The following
table (Table E) shows the total number of censorship events that are confirmed to have resulted
in affective and/or ideological polarization in all countries studied. 4 events are studied in China,
4 in Russia, and 2 in the United States, which creates a total of 10 events. For each event, an “X”
in a column will indicate whether that event resulted in ideological polarization, affective
polarization, or both. This table is a composite of the data from all previous tables.
Table E
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Country

Event

Ideological
Polarization

Affective
Polarization

Both

China

Schoolteacher
lacks enthusiasm
for revolution

X

China

Girl abused by
fervent
revolutionaries
for her parents’
occupations

X

China

Journalist
arrested for
exposing human
rights abuses

X

China

Journalist
arrested for
exposing human
rights abuses

X

Russia

Man arrested for
criticizing
government in
private
correspondence

X

Russia

Man arrested for
criticizing
government in
private
correspondence

X

Russia

Government
passes law to
restrict access to
“bad”
information on
the internet

X

Russia

Government
murders a
journalist

X

United States

Government

X

42

passes law
against
criticizing a war
United States

State
governments
pass laws
targeting
suspected
communists

X

According to this chart, ideological and affective polarization overlap in every case
studied here. This might indicate a correlation between the two types of polarization. Iyengar et
al. (2019) explains that strong partisans become emotionally attached to their political ideologies,
because those ideologies represent the cultural and socioeconomic categories that impact every
aspect of their lives. People tend to inherit their political ideologies from people with whom they
have strong emotional attachments, such as their family members. For this reason, both political
ideologies and emotional attachments to partisan groups tend to remain stable throughout a
person’s lifetime. Therefore, it makes sense that the triggering events in this chart generated both
affective and ideologically-motivated responses, because people have strong affective
attachments to their ideologies.

Policy Recommendations and Future Research
Even after reading this study, Americans may still wonder if there must be an arbiter of
truth on the internet. The only truth that we know as humans is that our knowledge of the world
is always changing; what may be flagged on Facebook as “false information” today might be
discovered to be true tomorrow. Furthermore, who is to say that these arbiters of truth are not
constructing the truth according to an agenda which they are paid to spread? Humans are
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inherently biased, so as long as the arbiters of truth are human, there can be no objective
decisions made on whether certain kinds of information are true or false.
Instead of creating a hierarchical system of information, it would be useful to look into
possibilities that do not anger social media users or refuse to acknowledge the fact that what is
currently deemed false may turn out to be true upon further investigation. Directly countering
beliefs which hold a strong emotional significance for people will only breed more conflict,
especially when there are gentler ways to persuade people to open their minds. Even if
something is blatantly false, social media platforms will certainly cause more harm by pointing it
out instead of letting the information circulate and either die a natural death, be embraced by
people whose opinions are already strongly formed, or rejected by people of another political
persuasion whose opinions are equally strong. The major issue with fact-checking is that
fact-checkers tend to target posts which contain information about people’s strongly-held beliefs.
A fact-checking label or a false information warning label increases people’s psychological
reactance by directly telling them that their strongly-held beliefs, to which they have intense
emotional attachments, are wrong. This angers social media users and increases their desire to
resist being persuaded by an outside source. However, if social media platforms presented
alternative sources of information more subtly, such as by offering users links to find out more
about certain topics, social media users would be less likely to view this as a personal attack on
their beliefs.
Social media platforms would do well to frame their fact-checking labels as benign
attempts to provide users with more research sources instead of as open attacks on users’ beliefs.
This approach to “misinformation” also subtly acknowledges the possibility that the social media
fact-checkers could be wrong, because it is not an attempt to push people’s beliefs in a set
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direction. Rather, this approach would give social media users additional sources to jumpstart
further research into a topic, and present additional considerations without telling users that their
beliefs are wrong. While this approach may reduce the animosity that fact-checking fosters
between users who hold opposite political opinions, it will most likely not do anything to change
users’ opinions, especially if users are emotionally committed to the information they spread.
Because users’ opinions are unlikely to change regardless of the way social media
platforms present alternative information, the next best thing they can do is foster civil discourse
instead of rampant bullying. Instead of censoring “false information,” it would be more
productive to sanction users who bully and harass others, and to make it easier for users to
anonymously report bullying and harassment. Many users take advantage of the anonymity
social media affords to abuse users who hold different political opinions, and even users who
choose not to stay anonymous have very little incentive to choose civil discourse over verbal
abuse. Social media platforms’ terms of use should be very clear about their policies on abuse
and give examples of language that could qualify as abuse. The streaming platform Twitch has
an automatic chat filter which identifies key words and phrases that could be abusive, and it
blocks users from sending public messages which include those words and phrases. This kind of
system would be very useful for Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter to adopt, because it would
force people to engage in discourse privately instead of verbally abusing each other in a public
thread or comment section. Moderating the ways in which people talk to each other, instead of
moderating what they talk about, could encourage people to explore their differences and
controversial topics in more polite ways. Shutting down all conversation on certain topics has
only widened the divide between more extreme members of each political party. Allowing more
extreme members of each political party to engage in public discourse, which is only moderated
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to prevent outright harassment, would encourage communication and open dialogue on important
topics.
Though this type of policy is an important part of the solution, it still does not address the
major root cause of online censorship. The biggest cause of online censorship is media
consolidation, and it would hardly be possible for Big Tech to maintain its dominance over the
market without millions of dollars in state and federal subsidies. Thus, the next step toward
breaking up the Big Tech oligopoly is the revocation of the subsidies that grant them an unfair
advantage over their competitors. This will be much more difficult than convincing them to
modify their community standards and terms of use because these companies wield immense
power and influence. Therefore, state and federal governments will be reluctant to revoke their
subsidies because that would impose a highly visible, immediate cost on a powerful interest
group. Legislators who support such measures may lose funding and support from Big Tech
members, which would hurt their re-election chances. Reducing subsidies very gradually, until
they hit a concrete expiration date, would be a more feasible strategy because it would obscure
the connection between specific legislators and the gradual elimination of subsidies.
The elimination of Big Tech’s monopolistic power over social media would make it
easier for smaller social media companies to enter the market and compete. In turn, this would
create more opportunities for social media users to find different platforms whose policies suit
their needs, and who may attract more like-minded users (for instance, in the way that Rumble, a
YouTube competitor, attracts conservatives who are banned from or dissatisfied with YouTube).
If right-leaning Americans feel like they have a variety of platform options from which to
choose, they may feel less targeted by the policies of Big Tech companies because they can
simply switch to another platform. Over time, this may lead to less resentment from right-leaning
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Americans because they will feel like there are places where their opinions are welcome, instead
of feeling constantly under attack by policies which appear to favor left-leaning opinions. This
will lead to less polarization overall, at least on social media.
Many other potential solutions to the censorship issue have been proposed. Hamburger
and Morell (2021) explain that state antidiscrimination laws should be used to hold Big Tech
accountable. Many states’ civil rights statutes would prevent Big Tech companies from silencing
users on the basis of political opinion; however, in order to remain constitutional, those laws
would need to be drafted and enacted in such a way that they do not prevent the companies
themselves from expressing their viewpoints. As long as the Big Tech companies remain
publicly-accessible platforms and are not themselves silenced, a law that prevents them from
discriminating against their users would most likely be constitutional. Hamburger and Morell go
on to argue that the Big Tech companies currently function as “common carriers” which receive
public funding; as such, the federal government has the authority to ban them from
discriminating against users. The Big Tech companies benefit from market dominance, which
leaves users with very few realistic alternatives, and they serve a public function while receiving
public funding. Thus, they may constitutionally be subject to anti-discrimination regulations.
This solution takes a different approach to the censorship issue than the one I have
proposed. Hamburger and Morell do not address media consolidation, but they do address the
fact that the Big Tech companies function very differently in the marketplace than do other
companies. As such, because the Big Tech companies function differently from purely private
companies, they must be treated differently and subjected to a different set of regulations.
Hamburger and Morell imply that while looser regulations work well for companies that are
purely private, and in industries where customers have plenty of alternative choices, loose
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regulations on companies that receive public funding, dominate the market, and provide a public
service can cause issues for customers. By this logic, it may be possible to address the problems
with censorship and polarization without directly addressing media consolidation. If government
regulations begin to treat publicly-funded Big Tech companies as partially-public agencies and
subject them to anti-discrimination regulations, users may feel more protected and less targeted.
As a result, these regulations may help to break the vicious cycle of one side feeling silenced,
becoming resentful, and becoming affectively polarized toward the other.
Mississippi senator Roger Wicker also supports anti-censorship legislation, but of a
different kind than that proposed by Hamburger and Mortell. Wicker (2021) points out that
federal law currently considers the Big Tech companies “neutral” platforms, which means that
they cannot be held legally accountable for the content that users post. He believes that if this
were changed so that these companies can be held accountable for users’ posts, they would allow
users to post a wider variety of viewpoints. Consequently, Wicker has introduced legislation
known as the Pro-Speech Act, which would “bar platforms from discriminating against users
based on their ideology and would require them to be transparent in how they manage or censor
content” (Wicker, 2021). Users would also be able to request that the Federal Trade Commission
investigate accusations of bias.
Wicker argues that “this legislation strikes a good balance between respecting the rights
of private companies and protecting free speech” (2021), but the Pro-Speech Act could easily run
into constitutional issues if certain terms are not defined and understood. Wicker’s first mistake
is in his argument that the Big Tech companies are private. This is incorrect, because a company
which receives generous public funding and incentives cannot be considered fully private.
Therefore, he is not completely addressing the issue at hand, which is that publicly-funded
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companies are using certain government-granted privileges to censor users based on their
ideologies. Next, this legislation implies that there will be increased government oversight of
tech companies, particularly with regards to their messages and management practices. If a
private platform wants to maintain a specific ideological commitment or send a certain message,
the Pro-Speech Act may interfere with its First Amendment rights to freedom of expression. This
legislation could become subject to the same pitfalls as the Fairness Doctrine if it prevents
companies themselves from sending their own messages and maintaining commitments to
specific values.

Conclusions and Implications
In summary, people are emotionally attached to their ideologies. Therefore, suppressing
people’s ability to express their beliefs intensifies conflict instead of convincing them to
reconsider their positions. In every case in this study, the targets of censorship reacted negatively
to being suppressed, which led the censors to fight even harder to suppress them and bred a cycle
of conflict between the two parties. Klein’s (2018) backlash effect is clearly vindicated by the
results of this study.
Clearly, the solution to American society’s growing concern with fake news is not to
censor those who are believed to be spreading it. According to this study, those accused of
spreading fake news will only fight back even harder if governments, corporations, or private
entities attempt to censor them. This will intensify conflicts between the suppressors and the
suppressed and make each side more emotionally attached to its message. Consequently, there
are two important things to keep in mind when considering the impact of censorship and fake
news on American society.
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First, the fact still remains that fake news is not the massive problem that corporate news
outlets make it out to be. As a result, governments and other entities are not justified in taking
such a drastic measure as censorship to curb a non-issue. Though polarization is increasing in the
United States, the majority of Americans are able to differentiate fake news from legitimate
news. In general, fake news only influences strong partisans whose emotional attachments make
it difficult to discern the facts (Guess et al., 2020). Its effect on voter turnout and voter
preferences is negligible, because voters tend to use heuristics such as partisanship and
demographic characteristics (race, socioeconomic status, gender, etc.) to make their decisions,
and their preferences tend to be immovable regardless of current news. Therefore, fake news
poses virtually no threat to American democracy. The miniscule benefits of censoring fake news
most certainly do not justify the risk of exacerbating partisan conflict and political polarization.
Second, this study demonstrates that even if fake news eventually becomes a problem,
censorship will only worsen the issue. The elements of human nature that determine people’s
responses to censorship will not change depending on the problems that fake news causes. The
backlash effect will still cause people to double down on their beliefs if they are censored or
challenged. As a result, the best thing that social media platforms can do at the moment is
minimize overt bullying and harassment instead of targeting specific viewpoints as “fake news”
and “misinformation,” which will only anger users and lead to even more online abuse and
polarization. The next step would be to subject all media platforms which receive public funding
to federal anti-discrimination regulations. However, the most ideal solution would be to revoke
subsidies and special privileges for large tech corporations, so they are forced to play by the
same rules as their smaller competitors in the market. Though corporatism is deeply entrenched
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in the American economy, it can be addressed with patience and intelligent policy design for the
benefit of free speech and reduced polarization.
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